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THE RESILIENCE OF LAW

ed
Joseph Vining

One of the striking developments in academic law in the past half century is the
reconception of law as one of the social sciences. The idea at work in this movement,
as Joseph Vining says in this essay, is not that the law should use the findings of
other disciplines for its own purposes and in its own way, but that in some deep way
law itself-legal thinking, legal life-can and ought to proceed on the premises of
social science, indeed of science itself This is in one seme obviously impossible: a scientific rule is a prediction offuture events based upon prior experience; a legal rule
is the expression of a mind speaking to other minds-to other persom-seeking to
affect their behavior by shaping their seme of the meaning as well as the comequences of what they do. Law works by an appealfrom mind to mind.
Yet in academic law, as in the culture more generally, the image of science as
the paradigm of thought, including legal thought, has enormous presence andforce.
The inherent dehumanization of this kind of thought-the erasure of the human
person, the voice, the mind, the elimination of human value and hope-threatens
both law and democracy at their core. Vining's deep claim is that even in the face of
these forces of dehumanization and trivialization law retains a life and vigor, a resilience, upon which we can found our hopes and seek to build.

After my first year in law school and a summer at a New York law firm,
which I loved, I was home for a bit before returning to my second year. It
was 1962. My father, an economist who had studied under Frank Knight
and Oskar Lange at Chicago in the 1940s, came into my room with the
manuscript of a book he was working on. Its title was On Appraising the
Pe,formance ofan Economic System: What an Economic System Is, and the Norms
Implied in Observers'Adverse Reactiom to the Outcome of Its Working. This was
going to be my legacy, he said. If he did not finish it, he hoped I would.
The book's argument was that an economic system was in fact a sys-
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tern of legislated rules, within the bounds of which economic actors made
their decisions, responding of course to incentives and disincentives and
others' actions under these conditions. It was a "mechanism," the behavior
of which, in the sense of outcomes of its overall action over time, was to be
described statistically. What the economist participating in the legislative
process was to do was to determine and set out for legislators considering
a change in a rule what the statistical consequence of the change would be,
with respect to one or another parameter such as income inequality or employment in which legislators were interested because they were dissatisfied. For clarity he proposed a notation: "The modifiable operating
mechanism, the thing for which economic system is the name ... , I shall denote by {0,S}." The S represented the collection of statistical mechanisms
that depended upon the 0, and "the 0," he said, "is to represent a set of constraining and prescriptive rules," that part of the thing that is "directly"
modifiable, a "system" of "statutory law and administrative rule."To be useful or even relevant, economists were to start with the set of rules that
could be so denoted by the abstract symbol 0.
I read into the manuscript and eventually came to my father and said
I could not help him. I could not help him because my sense of a "law'' or a
. collection of "laws"was so very different. Law, I had already seen, was expressed in words spoken by responsible human beings to one another, who
were listening to one another, and it was reexpressed and respoken over
time. The meaning and effect of a "piece" of human law in the world, its
very existence beyond the shadow existence a "dead letter" has, depended
upon its authority, which came from constant mutual work with it. Laws
might have systematic qualities but law was alive in a way rules that make a
system are not. Law could die as well as live. There is a world of difference,
I might have said if I had been older, between the authoritative and the authoritarian.
My father took the manuscript away. The problem I had was too central, the difference between us unbridgeable. He published the book
twenty years later,1 two years before I published The Authoritative and the
Authoritarian, 2 and in one of those strange encounters of life, indeed as
something of a sign of what has happened, his editor at Cambridge University Press came to where I was working, to head up the University of
Michigan Press.
The gulf between human law and rules that can be represented by an
abstract symbol remains as large today. My father's work was a chapter in
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the history of those who were involved in economics waking up to law,
which was then in time followed by those in law waking up to economics.
If they were academic lawyers-rather than practitioners, judges, or prosecutors and attorneys general carrying on the everyday work of law-larger
and larger numbers of them entered a period of trying to accede to the
claims of economics upon our thought, and beyond economics, the claims
of social science, and beyond social science, the claims of scientific
thought generally. The last were claims to a total occupation of the mind
that grew so much over this same period, connected, I think, to twentiethcentury experimentation with totalisms of various other kinds.
James Buchanan, whose Calculus of Consent3 appeared in 1962, the
same year as my conversation with my father, and who received the 1986
Nobel Prize in Economics for "public choice theory," speaks of the "economic theory of politics" involving "the extension of homo economicus to
behavior under observed institutional rules." He treats my father's work as
its precursor in several ways, principally in "initiating what was to become
a centrally important component ... , the stress on rules as contrasted with
the then universal stress on policy alternatives within rules."4 Like "public
choice theory," "mechanism design theory" in current economics also has
evident affinities with what On Appraising the Pe,formance of an Economic
System was seeking to achieve in its focus on law. 5 I do not think my father,
in his work, participated in the elimination of public value and the melding
of the premises of social science with those of natural science that is encapsulated in Buchanan's phrase homo economicus. My father's choosers and
modifiers of rules legislatively or administratively still acted on behalf of a
larger entity. But he was first of all a statistician. He repeatedly presented
the true form of a rule as the rule of an ordinary game and was enamored
of game theory which was then new. 6 He was himself a "player," to use that
term for a successful academic lawyer heard commonly in law schools
now-he was devoted to football. He thought of mathematics as the ultimately serious form of thought- hence the abstract symbol 0 precisely denoting the "set" of rules. While he might have demurred in life, he would
have understood in his professional capacity how the geneticist and Nobelist Fran<;ois Jacob could say in his Logic of Life, published contemporaneously with On Appraising the Performance of an Economic System, that there
is "no longer a difference in nature between the living and the inanimate
worlds," that "statistical analysis and the theory of probability have supplied the rules for the logic of the whole world," and that "large numbers
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are studied not so much because it is impossible to investigate the individual units, but mainly because their behavior is of no interest at all." 7
So, despite my father walking out of the room with his manuscript in
1962, that manuscript was a legacy to me. The fundamental premises of its
thought began to appear in academic law about the time I entered it. It
was not just economics in the form celebrated by Buchanan's Nobel Prize.
It was the turn toward social science more generally and, despite doubts
going back to its beginning, the turn of social science to the natural sciences. Into law-the most linguistic of disciplines, person speaking to person, individuals listening and speaking on behalf of persons-was imported the view that the discipline of law was a branch of social science.
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences makes it such today, and academic lawyers post their online papers on the Social Science Research
Network.
The public treatment of human language in academic law reflects
these developments in an important way. In 1961, Paul Freund, a name still
known in constitutional law, gave a little talk to my first-year moot court
club to introduce us to the world of law. He would say "a few things about
words, and then a few words about things." His theme was the problem, for
law, of writing dictionaries on the assumption that the difference between
the "statistical" norm and the "normative" norm could be eliminated-the
problem this presented for nuance in expression, the problem of the "impoverishment of language." Freund noted that law "lived by metaphor, advanced by simile." It "created," really, in its "overarching concepts." Speaking of the development of number theory in mathematics, which he
viewed as analogous but not the same, he said to us "the legal achievement
is no less a grand and important thing." A generation later, in 2006, I listened to a younger colleague give a talk on a public occasion in which he
implied everyone knew that "there was no sharp line between language and
law." I inwardly nodded. Then he went on, "and no sharp line between language and logic, or between logic and mathematics."
This ultimate turn, to mathematics, indicates how far the fact we are
speaking together can disappear from view. There are Vicos and Collingwoods still arguing, and Alfred Marshall's introduction to The Principles of
Economics is still there to be read, 8 but social science cannot escape its connection to the natural sciences and the premises or commitments of the
natural scientist today. Most social scientists would not want to escape
them. As the recent report of the quite representative commission setting
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up the new Life Sciences Initiative at the University of Michigan observed,
Closely allied to the life sciences are the social sciences, which,
though distinctive in their definition, are in fact concerned with a
particular level of analysis in living organisms (usually humans). Indeed the boundaries between neuroscience (a life science) and psychology (a social science) are rather indistinct and are becoming increasingly more so.... {T}he laws of physics and chemistry should, in
principle, be able to explain and predict biological phenomena in a
precise manner. Understanding these aspects of the life sciences in
the terms of mathematical modeling and theoretical applications of
universal laws and principles is one of our greatest challenges for the
next century. 9

In light of these premises of the natural scientist, so fruitful in exploration of what we may call the world of force and its "mechanisms" -to use
my father's word-finding a place for human purpose is an effort, to say the
least. It is a long step from a working-day "methodological naturalism" to
denying or to thinking one must deny the real existence of purpose even in
the evening. But the step is taken, to an "ontological naturalism" declared
and taught. A proper attention to the way things are, to which the development of statistical techniques and analysis can contribute, is joined to a
cosmic impossibility of an ought and the way things might be. We see all
around how easily this happens. Then with the departure of purpose goes
value, beyond "preference" which is the leaning of a system. And with the
departure of value, the distinctively legal meaning of "norm" in "legal
norm" is stripped away, as Paul Freund feared even in 1961.
But purpose and value are everywhere in the discipline of law. They always have been, they are now, and they signal the first and immediate difference between law and social science, the nature of a "legal rule." Different in the most basic way is what goes by the name "rule" in social science,
what must be ultimately its character, from what goes by the name "rule" in
law, this somewhat static form turning in the mind toward a more energetic form in the domestic and international hope for the "rule of law." Of
course it is a proper question and it is asked by lawyers themselves: why
can't a "legal rule" become like a "rule" conceived within the terms of social
science; why indeed is that not an ideal by the law's own lights, something
graspable, predictable, "objectively'' existing apart from the intentions,
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good faith, assent, and meaning of individuals and persons-like a rule of
chess? Much of the answer, I think, is that life is not a game, despite what
we all sometimes say about life.
Life is not a game and law is not, however much contest is brought into
law as a device in inquiry and reflection. Insofar as we are persons acting in
positions that are not ours alone, that connect us to other individuals and
that are defined by public value, there is an authenticity sought that is completely foreign to what we call "gaming." Games that are "play" are relief
and time-out from life, which is serious, painful, often tragic, as real as can
be. Sometimes we have to turn from the relief games give and, cliche
though it is, say to ourselves, our friends, our children, "This is for real, not
a game." Games can be good. They can be an entry into playfulness and its
creativity. There may be an aesthetic experience in games, a dance in them.
But games, as games, are empty, and their emptiness is a source of their relief and pleasure, the unconflicted joy in the exercise of capacities that they
allow. It makes no difference what the outcome is, really. The end of the
gam~, as game, is only a prelude to the beginning of another.
This difference in present character and ultimate ideal between legal
rules and scientific rules is wrapped up with the centrality of authority in
law, a phenomenon from which a social scientist would backpedal as if his
or her very identity as scientist depended on distance from it. Listen to the
distinguished contemporary neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux, turning
to the question whether the ordering of society might be "elevated" to the
rank of a science. Changeaux speaks of the "task of devising precise rules
of conduct," "the various prescriptions that regulate behavior at a given
moment of the history of a society," that "entire set of rules of interactions
among the individual members of a social group." He observes, as did the
commission on the Life Sciences Initiative at Michigan which I quoted
earlier, that ultimately those "precise rules," those "prescriptions that regulate behavior," "that entire set of rules of interaction," must be translatable
into "hierarchical and parallel sets of neurons {that} contribute to the cognitive functions that jointly construct a code of right action," and must be
understood in terms of natural selection, not just as the grounding of work
in biology, but as a total theory of the world. "Darwinian variations of social representations," Changeux says, working from the unstated premises
of many today in his and in related fields-by "Darwinian variations," he
means differences in "social representations" thrown up by chance on the
model of genetic mutation-are "propagated from one brain to another,
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selected at the level of the community, and finally retained in the minds of
lawmakers."10
What is critical in law is nowhere to be seen in this or any formulation
like it, including that with which I began this essay-my father's "{ 0,S} ," "an
operating, working modifiable mechanism ... the modifiable component
of which is a system of constraining and prescriptive law and rule." 11 Implicit even in references to "precise rules of conduct" and "the entire set of
rules of interactions among members of a social group," emanating from
the neural structures of "lawmakers," is the order that might be given after
someone says, "But that would be illegal," whether referring to taking a
baby from her mother or drilling for oil in the Arctic wilderness; the order
that might be given after saying, "Yes, that is legitimate," again whether referring to taking a baby from her mother or drilling for oil; 12 or, indeed, the
order implicit in opinions issued through an appellate hierarchy on how to
structure ongoing thinking and argument. Orders are implicit, but what is
forgotten, and forgotten throughout discussion of law in social scientific
terms translatable into basic science, is the correlative of an order, obedience.13 Never reached is why others out there obey, repeating the order in
their own voice and words with their own sense of it, and implementing it
or responding to it in good faith-not so much why they should obey, but
why they do obey, pay attention, and continue to pay attention when there
are so often so many reasons not to, when so much is at stake. What is forgotten, in short, is authority, the premise and the object of legal thinking,
legal argument, and legal conclusion, kept untouched by modernity's challenges to authority elsewhere, and not only kept but expanded with expanded claims for law, the "rule" of law, "law'' expanding around the
world. 14
One reason for forgetting the presence of authority in law-and the
inevitable issuing of orders and question of obedience-is the historical association of the development of scientific and social scientific work with
struggles for freedom of thought accompanying the political struggles of
the last few centuries, freedom of thought that, in an ironic turn, total theorists in the sciences today are so strenuously trying to limit. But more basic in the forgetting is the erasure of the individual in scientific and social
scientific thought, both the individual facing a claim of authority, listening
and himself or herself judging while listening, and the individual contemplated and protected in and by law. Neither is the person really there in scientific and social scientific thought, the individual person or the corporate

158

~

LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE

or institutional person, other than as a linguistic shorthand for a system.
Nor is there living value that makes claims on us. Authority, person, value,
individual - none are there, ultimately, in social science. All are there at the
center of law.
After the experience of the twentieth century, its struggles and its
horrors, the erasure of the individual is the most glaring. Units of one kind
or another of course figure in any professional thought and discussion. It is
widely said today that as interacting units you and I are "adaptive systems."
Someone using this term in professional scientific discourse would add, if
pushed, "and nothing more," an addition critical to the difference between
such professional thought and legal thought. Pictured in this way, a human
being at any particular point in the course of life is a snapshot of the particular and changing outcome of two factors interacting over time: internal system and external system, nature and nurture, genetic endowment
and environment. In 2007, journalists sought out expert commentary on
why a man waiting for the subway with his two daughters leapt to press
down between the tracks and save the life of a man who had suffered a
seizure and fallen in front of an oncoming train. What was offered was that
he had within him an "impulse" that was "followed spontaneously, either
by virtue of genetic disposition or childhood/cultural training." 15 These
were the two sources of what this human unit was.
But this is not the way we think about the individual-not me thinking, not you I imagine, not even those who speak in these terms. The word
for the unique product of the action and interaction of the two factors, internal system and external system, is in fact not "individual" but "phenotype." The way we do think about the individual is reflected in law and legal thought and includes something more than internal and external
system, something "in" the individual-you, me, the scientist and social
scientist too-which holds all of us back from vivisecting each other,
which almost holds us back from torture. 16 That is something real in social
scientists' minds and hearts and lives. It is real in law and legal thought, in
which they themselves participate, not least when they are facing an order
or asked to carry one out. Its reality, its presence, is alone enough to keep
law from being a social science or ever becoming a social science. 17
It is almost embarrassing to make these points, they are so obvious, so
unoriginal. Making them is like looking up and saying there is a sun in the
sky. But they do need to be made, and made more explicitly than they have
been. I have painted law as proceeding rather on its own, too important to
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be affected at its core by what has happened in academic law over the last
half century. But of course law has been affected. That is why it is better to
think of law, with all it presupposes and makes real in human life and
thought, as "resilient" rather than impervious.
Particularly striking, I think, has been the attempt to fit the law of the
central private institution of our time, the business corporation, to the
premises of social science. Twentieth-century corporate law developed
along lines analogous to the development of public administrative law,
with the focus on the decision being made on behalf of the corporate
body, and the questions being the authority of the decision maker, the enforcement of the decision if challenged, and the values and considerations
procedural and substantive taken into account by the decision maker, or
not taken into account. 18 In the 1970s and 1980s a push began to replace
this analysis-which assumed that profit in a competitive market was the
primary but not exclusive consideration if the corporation was a business
corporation-with analysis on the assumption that the legal standard for
decisions on behalf of business corporations was "maximization" of profit.
The very notion of maximization was drawn from Western microeconomic theory and from biology, where "maximization" describes what
must be done to survive in evolutionary competition or competition in a
"perfect market." In terms of the process of decision making, what began
to be taught in law schools as well as business schools was that "business"
thinking was supposed to be wholly calculating and manipulative, with no
place in it for any genuine concern for effects on employees, retirees, the
surrounding community, the nation, or the world.
This push, coincident with the movement of James Buchanan's homo
economicus into the academic picture of legislative drafting, administrative
regulation, and judicial decision making, reached the American Law Institute in the 1980s and early 1990s. It was proposed that the institute state
that the purpose of the business corporation should be "long-term maximization" of corporate profit and shareholder gain. This was rejected as a
reading of the law, judicial or statutory. The reason was explicit, that it referred to "maximization" which, the council of the institute observed,
would eliminate any authentic consideration of public value. In the institute's statement of what a "business purpose" was in corporate law, "maximization" of profit was replaced by "conduct of business activities with a
view to enhancing" profit. 19
But the teaching of maximization in its economic and biological sense
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continued even after the Enron case laid bare just what was being taught.
The response of the law, that in the "name" of which individuals speak, was
to move during this same period to the application of the criminal law to
the corporate entity itself-criminal law, in which the attitude toward
public value described by "maximization" precisely fits the standard formulation of what makes action or inaction criminal, the element of mens
rea, the criminal mind. As an example, causing death (a fact) becomes murder (a crime) as a result of "extreme indifference to the value of human
life." 20 That development in corporate criminality, state and federal, substantively and in sentencing, legislatively and administratively, reintroduces
taking into account values for their own sake in decisions made on behalf
of a business corporation. It has been fought in turn, and the struggle continues today. The struggle points up not only the effect of the effort to
push economic premises into legal thought, but law's resilience: here it is
living value, pushed out at one point, that can be seen reentering analysis at
another point.
On a larger canvas, there has been an attempt to introduce into legal
thought generally a form of "cost-benefit" analysis that excludes all else, in
line with the totalizing thought called "scientific" so frequently today.
There is, as is said, "nothing sacred," nothing that is just not done, nothing
that is not touched. It shows in the reopening of the question of torture. 21
"What does that mean, 'outrages upon personal dignity'?" the U.S. president asked in the struggle over the criminality of violations of the Geneva
Conventions. "That's a statement that is wide open to interpretation," he
continued. ''And what I am proposing is that there be clarity in the law so
that our professionals will have no doubt that what they are doing is legal .
. . . They don't want to be tried as war criminals. They don't want to break
the law." 22 What the president was reflecting is a view of law very much affected by its identification with social science. There are large implications-this is one of them -of the absence there of person, purpose, value,
individual, all folded into the term "human dignity'' found in the various
conventions against inhumane treatment of human beings. Person, purpose, value, individual are mocked, and not just in discussions of torture, as
being vague, too "imprecise" to affect "rational" decision making-"rational," of course, only in the sense defined by the deliberately limited presuppositions of social science.
It should not be overlooked that the current biological view of the living world may well have grown out of economics, rather than the reverse.
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The axiomatic hostility to what modern biology calls "vitalism" mirrors the
cynicism -the moral stance-of a view of the human as intrinsically alone,
ruthlessly self-seeking for a self that is axiomatically limited. The denial of
the humane in the human is not everywhere in biology and economics, but
it is prominent enough; and with and through these disciplines there has
been imported into thought and discussion in law the dichotomy seen in
both, between the "selfish" and the "altruistic,"with the selfish the undeniably basic and with the altruistic an illusion eventually to be understood in
a way consistent with the selfish. Not for nothing is the widespread popularity in academic discussion of the "prisoner's dilemma." Its imagery, imprisonment and threat from others of pain or death, fits an underlying vision of what it is to be human-utterly alone in the world and knowing
that one is utterly alone in the world.
But again this is not the view of law, which over time has more and
more protected the humane in the human. The individual contains the
whole world, but is not alone. The individual is connected with others
through participation in the life of living value, to which legal language
makes constant reference, participation indeed in the creation of living
value. As Alasdair MacIntyre has recently shown so well in his Dependent
Rational Animals, 23 there is no such dichotomy of the selfish and altruistic
in the real world, which is the world of law, where we are all dependent or
disabled at some point in our lives, receiving from those whom we cannot
repay and giving to those who cannot repay us, unpredictably and disproportionately in both the giving and the receiving. In this connection too I
might note as another example of law's resilience that the acknowledgment of the full range of living value, which developed during the first
three-quarters of the twentieth century in the law of standing and the very
conception of who a legal person can be, still stands despite pressure on it
from biological and economic thinking. The decoupling of the common
law of judicial jurisdiction from "property" and "contract," the abandonment of the so-called legal interest test of an earlier time, remains undisturbed by the presence of homo economicus in academic teaching and discussion. 24
The attempt to challenge the absolute prohibition in law of the torture of human beings is emblematic, as is the attempt to reconceive the nature of the legal persons we call business corporations. The language and
the way of thinking shown in this challenge and this reconception are case
studies in the implications of identifying law with social science. But there
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is a canvas larger still that may include the question of torture. On it can be
projected not only the implications of the pressure on law from this
identification but law's resilience under this pressure: the pushing back,
which the mind can feel, of the individual, the person, purpose, responsibility, living value.
Before us is a prospect of a kind different from the movement into law
of biological thinking and such social scientific thinking that blends into
it-economic, psychological, sociological, historicist. We are faced in law
with the achievements of biological science within its own sphere and with
developments in technology that permit manipulation in light of its
achievements. The very real possibility now of the creation of forms of being that are hybrids of humans and animals, the circumvention of the
breeding barrier that has heretofore identified an individual as of one or
another kind, or species, raises the old question of slavery in a new context.
And as Kazoo Ishiguro has explored quietly and effectively, 25 the possibility of beings genetically engineered for organ donation also raises that old
question of the association of property with human flesh. What is human,
what is less than human, law and lawyers will be asked, what or who is an individual in the sense in which we speak of individuals in law, what or who
is a person, what material forms of being human or almost human can be
bought and sold and exploited, and, yes, treated as animal? In addition to
this-the question of slavery-the genetic engineering of individuals, the
possibility of human clones, and the selecting of embryos "in" or "out" in
human reproductive technology all raise the eugenic question again in a
twenty-first-century context.
Slavery and eugenics-one would have thought the one was resolved
by the late nineteenth century and the other by the mid-twentieth. The
struggle with them is before us still. If anyone is dubious about the seriousness of the conflict when biological and eugenic thinking come to the
front of the legal mind, I suggest reading or reading again the Supreme
Court's decision on race and slavery in Dred Scott, that creatures with traces
of African blood in them could never reach a position of full human dignity and responsibility. There were two dissents, with Justice McLean's dissent pointing away from the biological and eugenic in a clear statement not
so much of law as of law's difference, a statement of what law can comprehend that is simply not comprehensible within the framework being
pressed upon it: ''A slave is not a mere chattel. He bears the impress of his
Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man; and he is destined to
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an endless existence. "26 Or read the Court's decision in Buck v. Bell on eugenics, that the poor, the less clever in calculating, the delinquent were less
than fully human and should not contribute to the future material of the
human form of being. This was the 1927 Court of Holmes, Stone, Brandeis, and Taft. There was one dissent without opinion. 27 It may be notable
that this sole dissent was by the only member of the Catholic Church on
the Court,Justice Butler, who went to Mass every morning, and that the
church's teaching was pointing by 1927 toward the universal human dignity
latent in law's distinctive recognition of the individual. 28
Dred Scott was overruled by John Brown, Harriet Beecher Stowe, a war,
and a century of internal legal development, but we are not certainly away
from it yet. Buck v. Bell has been reviled but never overruled or repudiated.
The questions of slavery and eugenics persist, as questions. How then can
it be thought law will stay resilient under these pressures and in face of
such enormous demands as these, when the very grounding of the human
may be shifting underfoot?
Law will stay resilient because the individual at home in law is the
bedrock, prior to any discussion of history or process, or presently existing
system, or scientific conclusion -in fact, prior to any discussion of "the individual." Though some individual waves his wand at us again and again, we
are not changed from the individuals we are into products or statistical notions. Beyond that bedrock-our actual presence to one another- I should
say there is some assurance in the fact that law, with its presuppositions
and, more than presupposition, its ontology, is the one thing other than
food that we cannot do without. Social scientists, too, cannot do without it.
Among the particulars that might be noted as we look forward, the
worldwide development of human rights law, 29 anticipated and perhaps in
some way affected by the evidence of the lonely dissents in Dred Scott and
Buck v. Bell, is founded on a vision of the individual and of the nature of
value that social science cannot share, and insofar as domestic law is
pressed by that mode of thought, international law can reach back and recall. Even while law in general was being identified in teaching and discussion with social science in general, international law emerging from the
revelatory horrors of "our" century was making implausible the
identification of "legal rules" that live in human minds and speech with
rules that can be conceived in the terms of social science. Indeed the development of the web of international conventions on genocide, on torture, on human experimentation, on inhumane treatment, on behalf of
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the disabled, on behalf of women and children has been loosening our own
law from the positivism that began to affect it and thinking about it, at
least in academic law, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, before the fifty years past that are our concern here.
One of these international developments, proceeding from the midcentury Nuremberg Trials, has been especially important in protecting the
understanding of the human individual as something more than the product of genetic and environmental systems. These are the legal limitations
on experimentation on human individuals, that arena where the legal vision of the human being and the scientific and social scientific vision explicitly confront one another. Such experimentation in the United States
had its own eugenic and authoritarian cast-its subjects disproportionately children, the poor, the military, or those who had some forebears who
had suffered slavery-and it was not pulled back substantially until the
1970s and 1980s.
I would add as important also the developing conception in law of the
sentient beings we call animals, the other part of the hybrids I have mentioned. This development is another reason to believe that commitments
to living value, to the individual, and to a dimension of reality that sustains
and attracts what we might call law's eschatological thrust have been fundamentally unaffected. It too has its international side. Legally recognizing
interests that are not proxies of human interests and acknowledging a
shared sentience and special human responsibility for its protection has
something of an a fortiori effect. In many ways the treatment of animals
was the horror in the revelatory events of the twentieth century, as human
beings were treated as animals so systematically and so cruelly, and when it
comes to our own behavior toward each other we should eventually be able
to exclaim, "Why, you would not do this to an animal!" Pulling the treatment of animals toward the treatment or the "legitimate" treatment of human beings, rather than the treatment of human beings toward the treatment of animals, is a working out of something within law, pushed not only
by law's restlessness with incoherence but also by law's eschatological
thrust, the pointing to a whole from the partial, which can be seen whenever the word "justice" is mentioned in the same breath as the word "law."
In secular terms, that might be thought "Hegelian" or "Platonic," though
Hegel had contempt for the American experiment, and there is the possibility Plato might have. I prefer to think in terms of John N oonan's articulation of the way an inner logic of a human institution works itself out over

THE RESILIENCE OF LAW

~

165

long periods of time, on slavery, on torture, and on the ownership and exploitation of women and children.3°
To be sure, whenever the border between human and animal is opened
to any extent, there can be migration in both directions across it. Hearing
the "cry of animals" as human cries are heard can reverse and can become
hearing human cries as the cries of animals. An essay by a neurologist featured in the Chronicle of Higher Education a few years ago proposed that human language and literature "grow out of a biological system for attempting to fill needs," and the piece argued for "reuniting language with the
screams and cries of animal communication, looking at it as a secretion of
one of the spongiest organs in the body." 31 But I think the movement
across today's more porous border between human and animal is rather in
the other direction, as the evolutionary biologist Simon Conway Morris
has so eloquently argued. 32
Mention of a view of language as "a secretion of one of the spongiest
organs in the body'' leads me to two final indications of the essential health
of the legal mind. One is the growing sophistication about the nature of
human language and its constitutive action in law. I was exposed to a precursor of it studying under Lon Fuller in the 1960s.33 But a full focus on the
importance of language began at about the same time as the development
of "public choice theory'' and similar schools of thought in economics and
their movement in various ways into academic law. That full focus is the
work of James Boyd White, in volume after volume. 34 White has made
clear that the sounds made by isolated competitors contending with one
another, or the sounds made in advertising or political manipulation, are
not the language of a person and not language with the force of law, but the
sounds of force and force alone. I emphasize "alone" because they fit a vision of the human world, indeed the universe itself, in which there are ultimately only forces (as Oliver Wendell Holmes once said). This is not the
world of law. Because of White and his work, it can be said with confidence
that when Steven Pinker or Herbert Simon and the disciplines with which
they are associated speak of language, its origins, mechanisms, and meaning, they are not talking about human language, or about the language of
law, but about something else, in rather the same way that so many who set
out to study the idea of God are not thinking about God, but about something else. 35
There is, secondly, a new openness of mind among figures prominent
in discussion of organized human life. The representative figure outside
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law may be Jurgen Habermas, whose grappling with the issues raised by our
new capacities for manipulation of the material substrate of the human has
led him to acknowledge the sometime dependence of secular discussion
on a dimension of reality that is not secular-in his words, "to the reasonable attitude of keeping one's distance from religion without closing one's
mind to the perspective it offers;' or "keeping a distance ... from a religious
tradition whose normative substance we nevertheless feed on," or acknowledging "moral feelings which only religious language has as yet been able to
give a sufficiently differentiated expression."36
This openness, which can be seen more widely in arriving at consensus
at each stage in the expansion of universal human rights, is beginning to be
matched within law by an increasingly explicit acknowledgment of an uninterrupted ontological commitment in law to a dimension of reality that,
whether or not it is or is called religious, has no place in scientific work or
social science. Perhaps it can never have and should not have a place, given
the power of the scientific method in understanding and possibly freeing
us to some degree from the blind systems of the world with which and
within which we live. The representative figure I would point to in this
connection is Steven Douglas Smith, whose work and contributions to
law's self-understanding have also been developing alongside the movements with which I began.37 Habermas and those who work with his work,
White and those who work with his, Smith and those who work with his,
other examples from this volume-all these are not going to go away. If law
and the legal mind were a rough tough animal, they are nourishing its
bones and sinew. There is, both within law, even in academic law, and outside law, even in academic social science and social theory, increasing
awareness that the human which the humanist insists is "all we have got" includes an open dimension to which there is really no limit.
This should not be surprising. The world of the active mathematician
is not accessible to many, even though the operation and application of
mathematics may be. But it is a familiar thing to hear that mathematicians
who call themselves realists acknowledge a dimension of reality that transcends the here and now of our developing physical existence. They sayand invite us to accept-that natural selection as a "theory of everything"
does not reach and cannot explain mathematics, which is not, in itself, reducible to the organization of neural tissue, but is real in a realm of its own.
Lawyers and all those actively participating in law who are realistic about
their thought and action acknowledge a dimension of human experience
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of reality that is not at all the same as that of realist mathematicians but,
like theirs, lies both beneath and beyond the realities admitted by the rules
and presuppositions of the natural and social sciences.
Law will be tough enough in the future. We can speculate why it has
not been tougher in the past. There are tensions within law, as there are in
your and my own thought, and there always have been. Identification of
law with social science can have been an effort to escape them. Social science and science behind it perhaps need not have pressed so. They might
just have offered themselves, for there is a constant pull toward the authoritarian, the meaningless, the automatic, away from responsibility, away
from facing grief for what we ourselves do. Work in law even has an element of the frightening in it, which must be handled in some way. Just as
there is biblical awe, dread, and fear, so too can it be positively frightening
to think that what is necessary to authenticity of any kind at any level-and
necessary therefore to authority and therefore to law-runs straight up to
a transcendent dimension of the universe. This is a problem the social scientist of our time, thinking as a social scientist, does not have. But the
lawyer does.
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